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A B S T R A C T
What has been identiﬁed as, according to the relevant literature, the relationship between
natural resources and conﬂict? In what ways are natural resources used to trigger conﬂict
and instability? Who are the main players and actors in resource conﬂicts? To address these
questions, this article critically reviews the main theoretical and empirical works on con-
ﬂict, natural resources, abundancy and scarcity. In doing so, the article aims to update the
existing discussion with the latest literatures, which is more skeptical about the relation-
ship between natural resources and conﬂict. Constructively, the main objective of this review
is to explain that in spite the diverse arguments on show; there is a systematic shortcom-
ing in the existing literature. In doing so the article illustrates persistent research shortcomings
and diﬃculties in the theoretical and empirical arguments that have been put forward
so far.
Copyright © 2018, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The theoretical literature on natural resources can be
divided into two main groups, resource abundancy and re-
source scarcity. Literatures falling in the ﬁrst group argue
that abundancy of natural resources (non-renewable) leads
to violence, inequality and conﬂict, while those of the second
group claims that scarcity (both renewable and non-
renewable) of natural resources can in fact alternatively
contribute to conﬂict and instability. In laying out their cases,
each side utilizes different methods and theoretical frame-
works to support their presented arguments. By reviewing
the main theoretical and empirical literature on conﬂict,
natural resources and security studies this paper seeks to
answer the following questions. What has been identiﬁed,
according to the relevant literature, the relationship between
natural resources and conﬂict? In what ways are natural re-
sources used to trigger conﬂict and instability?Who are the
main players and actors in resource conﬂicts?
This paper is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part traces
the evolution of the natural resources and conﬂict debate.
The objective of this section is to give an overview of the
origins and development of the natural resources discus-
sion, something that is missing from previous literature
reviews.1 The ﬁrst reason for putting forward this contri-
bution is the practical importance of the subject matter at
hand. The existing literature ﬁelds, ranging from environ-
mental studies and international relations to the economy
are all affected by the resource conﬂict nexus. The second
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1 Several literature reviews have already been written by other schol-
ars, such as Koubi et al. (2013), Mildner and Lauster (2011) and Samset
(2009). Despite their rich discussion, these scholars neglect herein however
the origins and development of the term resource wars. Furthermore, while
they critically describe the intrastate terms and literature ﬁndings, they
have paid less attention to the interstate conﬂicts.
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reason for this offering is that it may help us to better trace
how the argument about an assumed resource conﬂict re-
lationship ﬁrst developed, and how it subsequently evolved.
In outlining these developments, I illustrate how some of
the terminology regarding resource conﬂicts being affect-
ed by the events of the 1970s, such as the Arab Oil Embargo
whereas, some expression over time have ultimately
emerged from the intuition and overestimation of scholars.
The second and third parts will analyze the main the-
oretical and empirical ﬁndings. In doing so, themain purpose
is to gain insight from prior works. These sections will the-
oretically discuss two grand concepts, namely abundance
and scarcity. First, this paper ﬁnds that it is scarcity, itself,
rather than natural resources that may lead to conﬂict. In
other words, some countries have scarcity of non-resource
factors, namely technical, knowledge and human capacity
rather than natural resources, which can lead to scarcity
within abundancy of resources. Secondly, this paper illus-
trates that although these approaches do provide some
explanations, they fail to portray the correlation between
natural resources and conﬂict in a way that does justice to
its full complexity. In concluding the paper, I combine my
ﬁndings and highlight the gaps within existing argu-
ments, namely political and economic costs of conﬂict,
involvement of multiple actors and non-resource dimen-
sions of conﬂict and conﬂict ﬁnancing.
2. Classiﬁcation and history of resource wars
The natural resource-conﬂict nexus is one of the most
popular debates among international relations scholars. The
classiﬁcation and explanation of the concept of natural re-
sources depends on the context in which the term is used.
In this regard, it is important then to ﬁrst deﬁnewhat is even
meant by natural resources. According to the annual report
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), natural resources
are “stocks of materials that exist in the natural environ-
ment that are both scarce and economically useful in
production or consumption, either in their raw states or after
a minimal amount of processing” (Bacchetta et al., 2010,
p. 5).2
Another point of note is the speciﬁc type of resource
being referred to. Natural resources can be divided into two
main groups: renewable and non-renewable ones. Renew-
able resources include land, forests and water; non-
renewable ones include diamonds, fossil fuels andminerals.
To measure the effect of non-renewable resources on vio-
lence scholars have classiﬁed the former according to
particular measures and characteristics, such as non-fuel and
fuel, lootable and non-lootable resources, and point and
diffuse resources.3
There are several important active debates among schol-
ars with regard to the relationship between natural resources
and conﬂict. The literature on conﬂict be divided into three
groups: those that argue that natural resources lead to ‘intra-
state conﬂicts’ (Collier & Hoeﬄer, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Ross,
2006), literature which claim that natural resources lead to
‘inter-state conﬂicts’ (Borgerson, 2009; Kleveman, 2004;
Klare, 2001a, 2001b;Moyo, 2012), and ﬁnally, those that em-
phasize both intrastate and interstate conﬂicts (Colgan, 2014;
De Soysa, 2007). The second of these groups is also called
that of the ‘Great Powers’ or ‘Blood Oil’ adherents (De Soysa
et al., 2009; Fettweis, 2011).
2.1. The development of the term resource war
After the debate and concern about the resource-conﬂict
nexus had emerged among scholars how did it then evolve
over time? The term ‘resource war’ ﬁrst appeared in the
United States in the early 1980’s (Le Billon, 2004, p. 1). It
referred to the Soviet movements in Afghanistan, theMiddle
East and Africa, whichwere perceived as threats to US access
to important natural resources (Klare, 2001a, 2001b, p. 236).
Ironically, despite the alarmist assumptions, the idea of a
resource war turned out to be misguided. Stern (2016) ex-
plains that the reason for this was the misperception of
scholars at the time, who exaggerated the threats arising
from these resources and particularly oil. Considering the
conditions of the ColdWar, one may claim that any attempt
at a resource grab by one of the Great Powers would be sub-
sumed under the propaganda of war.
While the term resource war was used in the 1980s,
scholars had in fact already started a debate about the
resource-conﬂict nexus in the early 1970s due to the Arab
Oil Embargo, and the nationalization of key natural re-
source industries.4 The Oil Embargo was followed by the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, which affected the global oil
supply. In the year after the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war
then began, this decreased the oil production of both coun-
tries. These events increased the alarmist concerns of
scholars, who started to believe that the nature of conﬂict
was changing (Dannreuther & Ostrowski, 2013). In light of
this, several theoretical concepts emerged in the 1980s, such
as ‘oil-weapon’, ‘energy-nationalization’ and ‘oil wars’.
Since the end of the 1980s, as a result of several polit-
ical and economic developments such as the invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq and in turn the invasion of Iraq by the U.S.,
the term resource war has been changed and reframed a
number of times. New phrases have also been added to the
literature, ranging from general to concrete terms, such as
the Great Game, resource curse, resource conﬂicts, con-
ﬂict resources, blood oil, strategic oil and environmental
confrontation.
In the mid-1990s, for example, some scholars pro-
posed that the so-called Great Game re-emerged for a second
time in the resource rich geographic areas such as the
Caspian Sea and the Arctic Sea regions. The ﬁrst reason for
this was that the Caspian Sea region’s natural resources were
2 See: World Trade Report 2010 for an executive summary, https://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2b_e.pdf.
3 If a resource requires less investment, and unskilled labor to extract
and transport it while also having a high market value then, it is a lootable
resource (Samset, 2009). Diffuse resources meanwhile are spread over vast
areas and can be extracted by a large number of groups while point re-
sources are located in a small sized area and controlled by a limited group
of producers.
4 See Connelly and Perlman (1975); Arad (1979), Sharing Global
Resources.
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opened to international investments in the early 1990s
which led to it being perceived as an alternative to the
Persian Gulf. The second reason was the development of
ﬂeets in the Arctic Sea region. However, the reappearance
of the Great Game notion is another illogical exaggeration
because it has been proven that the Caspian Sea does not
have the same resource capacity as the Persian Gulf, and
the extreme conditions of the Arctic Sea region do not allow
for the exploration of those resources. As such, some of the
terms established a connection between the resource and
conﬂict based on false intuition rather than analysis, which
ultimately makes such arguments journalistic rather than
scientiﬁc.
The term ‘resource cursemeanwhile,’ emerged in the late
1980s as a way to address the economic crises being ex-
perienced by resource rich countries. The resource curse
theory was ﬁrst introduced by Richard Auty in 1993.
However, it was the high proﬁle paper of Sachs andWarner
(1995) that really drew attention to the resource curse ar-
gument. Resource curse adherents argue that an abundance
of resources and particularly oil in developing countries
weakens the economic, democratic, and institutional ca-
pacities of national governments, making their societies
vulnerable to armed disputes (Andersen & Ross, 2014;
Ross, 2012).
The terms resource conﬂicts and conﬂict resources were
popularized by Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998). The ‘resource
conﬂict’ framework links the onset of armed violence to the
exploitation and control of natural resources. The ‘conﬂict
resources’ framework, meanwhile, proposes that the high
market value of resources offers ﬁnancial opportunities for
belligerents, individuals or rebel groups which encour-
ages them to take up arms or to prolong military conﬂicts
(Le Billon, 2012; Samset, 2009).
The ‘blood oil’ and ‘strategic oil’ are used by speciﬁcal-
ly De Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie (2009). They used the ﬁrst of
these to refer to the great power adherents, who de-
scribed the relationship between resource and conﬂict as
that of a simple competition between the Great Powers.
Some of the blood oil proponents are also called the Great
Gamers. By using the strategic oil argument, De Soysa,
Gartzke and Lie propose that oil resources provide petro-
states with the protection of powerful countries, which
encourages aggressive behavior among petroleum exporters.
The term environmental confrontation was added to the
lexicon Jasper Humphreys, who argued that “the concept
of resource wars has becomemeaningless, not only because
of its lack of clarity but also because the absence of re-
sources is a primary driver in war. Conﬂicts around resources
and commodities are more usefully framed within ideas of
environmental confrontation” (2012, p. 1082).5 Hum-
phreys explains that he used the term confrontation instead
of war or conﬂict because within the environmental arena
confrontation conveys the notion essence of many differ-
ent clashes. The term resource is also restrictive, since it
covers only strategic resources like oil and gas but overlooks
life resources that are important for human survival: water,
soil and ecosystems.
In sum, the intellectual developments of ideas and ex-
pressions regarding the resource-conﬂict relationship ﬁrst
blossomed after the Arab Oil Embargo of the 1970s. Since
then, a number of different related terms and concepts have
been popularized in the literature. Although some schol-
ars have indeed based their arguments on particular world
events such as the Iraq-Iran war and the economic
underperformance in resource rich developing countries,
some of the ideas emerged due to the imagination, false in-
tuition and overstatement of academic onlookers. While
these terms tend to cover a variety of resource dimen-
sions, some of them such as the Great Game ultimately
belong to the journalistic level.
3. Resource scarcity: theoretical and empirical debates
What is scarcity and how can resource scarcity lead to
instability and conﬂict? Scarcity is basically explained as im-
balance between ﬁnite supplies and inﬁnite demand. For
example, according to the Oxford English Dictionary,
“scarcity is insuﬃciency of supply; smallness of available
quantity, number, or amount, in proportion to the need or
demand” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2016). In other words,
scarcity deﬁnition is mostly based on supply and demand
interaction.6 Despite this broad deﬁnition, scarcity is inter-
preted differently by different scholars. This interpretation
can be divided into three main groups, namely neo-
Malthusians, distributionists and cornucopians (resource
optimists).
One may ask what Malthusianism is, and when the orig-
inal discussion around its thinking began. Homer-Dixon
(1999) argues that although the original argument regard-
ing population growth, natural resources and scarcity ﬁrst
dates back to the eras of Confucius and Plato, the current
debate was initiated by the British economist Thomas
Malthus in 1798.7 Malthus claimed that the human popu-
lation increases exponentially, whereas food production only
grows at a linear rate. Neo-Malthusians thus argue that an
abnormal gap between population growth and natural re-
sources availability leads to frustration, insurrection and
conﬂict. Themain argument herein is that the physical avail-
ability of natural resources is limited and if the gap between
demand and availability increases then scarcity, competi-
tion and eventually violence will ensue (Homer-Dixon,
1999).8 Neo-Malthusians consist of environmentalist and
peak-oil/gas supporters.
However, distributionists explain scarcity from social and
institutional perspectives as they argue that the key prin-
cipal of prosperity is the equal distribution of power and
wealth rather than the availability of natural resources.
5 He deﬁnes the term as follows: “High politics’ of oil, gas and water
as part of national security, with disputes labelled as ‘resource wars”
(Humphreys, 2012, p. 1065).
6 Detailed discussion on the concept of scarcity, see PhD Dissertation
by Kester (2016).
7 See: The original model of Malthus (1798). An Essay in the Principle
of Population, Reprinted, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8 A number of scholars have in more recent times also found a posi-
tive relationship between resource scarcity and violence. Important
examples include Arad, U. B. (1979); Bachler (1996); Hauge and Ellingsen
(1998); Kahl (2008); Urdal (2005); Westing (1986).
74 A. Bayramov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 9 (2018) 72–81
Although this idea has been adopted by a number of other
scholars, the arguments of distributionists are particularly
blessed byMarxists and neo-Marxists (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
The third group is cornucopians, which includes econo-
mists and adherents of technology. This group of scholars
is refuting the arguments of the previous groups by arguing
that market and technological innovations can solve scar-
city problem. The term ‘cornucopian’ is taken from the
Ancient Greek horn of plenty (Gleditsch & Theisen, 2010).
Cornucopian scholars (Boserup, 1965, Gleditsch, 1998;
Simon, 1996; Theisen, 2008) argue that although natural re-
sources are not abundant, they are also not limited as
described by neo-Malthusians. According to cornucopians
scholars, people are the “ultimate resource” and human in-
genuity has a strong capability to deal with the results of
scarcity (Simon, 1981). They put technological develop-
ments and market forces at the centre of their explanations
and argue that market mechanisms and advances in tech-
nology can improve the methods that people use to handle
resource scarcity. Similarly, drawing on the ideas of de-
mocracy and cooperation, liberal scholars propose that
conﬂict over common resources is more expensive to pursue
than cooperation is.
The second question is that in what ways these groups
link scarcity to instability and conﬂict? Homer-Dixon (1999)
identiﬁes that resource-scarcity can lead to three types of
conﬂict: interstate, group identity and insurgency. With
regard to the ﬁrst, the existing debate claims that renew-
able resources rarely lead to conﬂict between states
(Brochmann, 2012; Dinar, 2011; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Ac-
cording to Koubi, Spilker, Hohmelt, and Bernauer (2013),
water is the only renewable resource that the literature pays
extensive attention to when addressing interstate conﬂict.
The reason for this is that water is essential to agricultural
development and growth, as well as the construction and
use of military facilities (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The exist-
ing literature argues that the dispute over water resources
might occur in particular conditions, such as political con-
testation between downstream and upstream neighbors.
According to Homer-Dixon (1999), a conﬂict between
modern states over renewable resources is unlikely. First,
it is diﬃcult to convert cropland and forests into state power.
Second, those countries whose economy is strongly depen-
dent on renewable resources are likely to be poor, and poor
ones simply cannot afford to buy the sophisticated mili-
tary equipment needed to start a war. However, states can
increase their state economic and military powers through
non-renewable sources.
This argument is advanced by scarcity of peak oil/gas ad-
herents which links the scarcity of natural resources to the
great power competition (Klare, 2001a, 2001b). According
to these scholars, one of the main reasons for interstate con-
ﬂict occurring is the intrinsic competition between great
powers, which increases the chance of conﬂict onset in
resource-rich areas. For example, economist Moyo (2012)
argues this competition has intensiﬁed in recent times due
to the rapid growth of China, India, and the return to prom-
inence of Russia, which has increased the demand for limited
natural resources primarily oil. Moyo is not alone in her ar-
gument, Susanne(2004) suggests that resource wars are the
new threat to future global security in the international arena
due to the sharp decline of natural reserves, particularly oil,
as well as to the unequal distribution of them between the
Global North and Global South. However, Price-Smith (2015)
argues that there is no empirical evidence of a severe scar-
city of non-renewables being destined to drive the great
powers to make war on one another. It is worth to mention
that it is not only consumption, but also production, that
is now increasing. Also, new energy producers have joined
the global energy market as a result of technological de-
velopments. An important example of this is the global oil
glut experienced in both 2015 and 2016.
From the perspective of group identity and insurgency
conﬂicts, the existing literature proposes diverse research
ﬁndings, such as population growth, environmental deg-
radation, weak institutions, and an unequal power
distribution are themain independent mechanisms that can
cause internal violent conﬂict (dependent variable). However,
the different and contradictory results of scholars render the
overall general conclusion reached contentious. For example,
Homer-Dixon (1994) argues that environmental degrada-
tion, population growth, and fresh water scarcity contribute
to armed violence (other scholars backing this claim are:
Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Urdal, 2005). In contrast, Theisen
(2008) mentions that water scarcity does not increase the
chance of civil conﬂict whereas crucial land degradation cer-
tainly can contribute to violence. Urdal (2005) outlines that
both population growth and land scarcity increase the
chance of violence. Overall these examples illustrate that
there is a lack of clear consensus among scarcity scholars
due to their different case studies, instruments of measure-
ment and time frames.
The arguments of scarcity adherents have been chal-
lenged by a number of scholars in terms of qualitative and
quantitative ﬁndings. According to Stern (2016) the as-
sumptions underpinning the scarcity notion are illogical due
to the exaggeration of threats arising from oil ownership
from misperceptions of market information. Furthermore,
Koubi et al. (2013) explain that despite their strong empir-
ical explanations, scarcity scholars have weak quantitative
research results ones that fail to prove the link between re-
source scarcity and intrastate or interstate conﬂict. The
reason for this is that some large-N ﬁndings contradict early
results, which illustrate that the scarcity-conﬂict nexus is
more complicated than scarcity scholars would have us
believe. Dinar (2011), meanwhile, argues that natural re-
source scarcity may in fact be an important force for
cooperation between states. However, scholars of natural
resource scarcity have hitherto ignored the ways in which
scarcity can spur cooperation (Deudney, 1999).
Considering these ﬁndings, three conclusions can be
drawn from this section. First, scarcity is a complex term
and it should not be equated with only natural resources.
As it is explained by Kester (2016) some countries may suffer
from scarcity of technical, knowledge and human capaci-
ty rather than natural resources. In light of this, without a
proper capacity it is also possible to have scarcity within
abundancy of resources. While supporting the scarcity ar-
gument, Andrews-Speed (2015) offer an alternative
explanation that natural resources are not physically scarce
but there are indeed economic, political, environmental and
equity barriers that can lead to a scarcity of natural resources.
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Due to the strong rule of law, decent neighbourly rela-
tions and existence of strong norms for compromise and
of multilateral institutions, the North Atlantic countries are
highly unlikely to utilize force against or declare war to each
other. However, these dimensions and buffers are cur-
rently lacking in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. As such,
the U.S and Europe should work closely with these regions
to prevent any resource disputes erupting (Andrews-Speed,
2015). Similarly, Gleditsch (1998) explains that some highly
developed countries have population density, clean water,
and land degradation problems but they still do not suffer
from environmental violence. Thus the main issue might
be that poor economic development, rather than environ-
mental scarcity, leads to conﬂict. Kester (2016) names this
situation as “second-order-scarcity” which refers to a lack
of technology, economic capacity, and knowledge to stop
resource scarcity. In this regard, it may be scarcity, itself,
rather than natural resources that leads to conﬂict.
Second, conﬂict can be deﬁned differently based on dif-
ferent dimensions. However, the common consensus is that
conﬂict consists of multiple dimensions (political, econom-
ic, environmental, historical, cultural, and geographical etc.)
rather than single factor. In this regard, scarcity of natural
resources is not strong enough, by itself, to induce either
interstate or intrastate conﬂict. It needs in fact to interact
with other variables. Finally, related to the previous reasons,
scarcity of natural resources might be a contributing or mar-
ginal reason for rather than the root cause of a given conﬂict.
In other words, it needs to interact with non-resource factors
in order to cause violence.
4. Resource abundance debate
Second group of scholars has sought to illustrate that it
is not scarcity, but rather the abundance of natural re-
sources that leads to interstate and intrastate conﬂicts
(Collier & Hoeﬄer, 1998; Collier, Hoeﬄer, & Rohner, 2009;
De Soysa, 2002; Koubi et al., 2013; Le Billon, 2007). Themain
academic debate offers various frameworks regarding the
relationship between resource abundance and conﬂict,
such as greed versus grievance, onset versus duration, the
resource curse, the rentier state, the Great Game, and ag-
gressive (revolutionary) state model. Each of these concepts
proposes different qualitative and quantitative ﬁndings by
connecting abundancy of natural resources to conﬂict. The
unity in diversity is that they cover mostly the non-
renewables that tend to have a high market value such as
diamonds, oil, natural gas, gold and raw minerals.9 In the
following section, I will discuss the interstate and intra-
state literature separately due to the diversity of concepts
and assumptions in play.
4.1. Intrastate conﬂicts and natural resources
In 1998 World Bank economists Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeﬄer, published their leading article on ‘Economic
Causes of Civil War’, explaining the relationship between
non-renewable resources and intrastate conﬂict. Since then,
a vast body of literature has gone on to scrutinize the re-
source abundance-conﬂict nexus (Collier & Hoeﬄer, 1998,
2004, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Le Billon, 2011; Ross, 2001,
2004, 2012).
The greed versus grievance argument is one of the most
important debates among such scholars. Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2004) claim that resource-abundant countries have a high
potential to witness rebel movements and civil war because
the wealth available from non-renewable resources offers
a ﬁnancial opportunity for rebellion groups. Such individu-
als are identiﬁed as “greedy rebels”. In this episode of
violence, the lootable character of resources plays a deter-
mining role which is called the ‘opportunity hypothesis’
(Collier & Hoeﬄer, 1998). In contrast, another group of schol-
ars argues that resource abundance increases the chance of
‘grievance’ oriented civil conﬂicts when a particular ethnic
group dominates the resources and their distribution or
when the local population is frustrated by resource expor-
tation (Ross, 2004;Wick & Bulte, 2006). Mildner and Lauster
(2011) propose three reasons for such grievances: ﬁrst, the
weak state capacity can increase rent-seeking motives;
second, it can lead to shortages of public goods; and, third,
at weakened capacity can decrease the ability to inter-
vene of the state. However, the greedy rebel argument has
been challenged by a number of scholars. For example,
Cramer (2002) posits that the arguments of Collier and
Hoeﬄer are reductionist, speculative andmisleading because
they overemphasize the role of material resources and their
proﬁtability. In doing so, they omit other features of con-
ﬂicts, such as social, cultural and historical factors. In light
of this, the greedy rebel argument seems too straightfor-
ward to be believed as it implies that the mere obtention
of resources is the main guiding purpose of rebellion rather
than justice, ideology, political frustration and/or external
factors.
Second discussion is ongoing between duration of vio-
lence and civil war onset. According to Ross (2004), while
oil can increase the chance of conﬂict onset, diamonds (as
another lootable resource) can only have an impact on the
duration of the conﬂict. Lujala (2010) contribute this argu-
ment by drawing attention to geographical location of
natural resources, namely oil. Lujala (2010) argues that
onshore oil production is more likely to lead to the onset
of conﬂict than offshore production is as rebel groups can
easily access onshore oil sources. Going back to Ross, he
offers a more detailed analysis in his recent book, The Oil
Curse (2012), one that slightly differ from what he origi-
nally said in 2004. According to him “when oil-producing
states fall prey to civil war, oil is never the only factor; it is
sometimes not even the most important factor. Natural re-
source wealth alone is insuﬃcient to start a secessionist
movement” (2012, p. 145).
By using dichotomous variables, several scholars ﬁnd a
positive relationship between resource abundance and in-
trastate conﬂict duration rather than civil war onset (Fearon,
2005; Thies, 2010). Le Billon (2005) asserts that geograph-
ic and proﬁtability (illegal or legal) characteristics play a
determining role in conﬂict duration because resources,
which are far away from government control andmore likely
9 Authors who analyze diamonds include Gilmore, Gleditsch, Lujala and
Rød (2005); Humphreys (2005); Ross (2006); Le Billon (2008). Lootable
and non-lootable resources, meanwhile, are discussed by Le Billon (2001);
Lujala (2009).
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to illegal traded, are more attractive to rebel groups. Mildner
and Lauster (2011) connect the lootable or non-lootable
character of resources such as diamonds to resource dura-
tion. They identify two kinds of diamonds: primary and
secondary. The ﬁrst require great effort and sophisticated
technology to mine, which makes them unattractive to
rebels, while the second, meanwhile, can be found in loose
soil or sediments.
Finally, in the late 1980s scholars added the resource
curse argument to the discussion. This hypothesis pro-
poses that resource wealth in developing countries leads
to economic disarray, less democracy, authoritarianism, weak
government capacity and institutions that make society vul-
nerable to conﬂict onset as well as increase the chance of
armed disputes arising (Ross, 2001, 2004, 2012). These even-
tualities stem from the mismanagement of resource
revenues (mostly oil), and situations where the source of
state fund is mainly oil rather than taxation, the national-
ization of resource markets and industry, and the volatility
of resource prices. The resource curse scholars take the end
of 1970s as the starting date of resource curse because re-
source production in non-Western countries was controlled
by the Seven Sisters, which changed only with natural re-
source nationalization in the 1970s.10
However, the arguments put forward in relations to abun-
dance have been challenged by a number of scholars. First,
from a quantitative perspective, a number of scholars crit-
icize the ﬁndings of the resource curse line of thinking for
being weak with respect to measurement instruments, time
frame and restrictive empirical analyses (Boschini, Pettersson,
& Roine, 2007; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Haber &
Menaldo, 2011; Luong & Weinthal, 2010). Haber and
Menaldo (2011), for example, by using the broader data set,
could not ﬁnd evidence to support the resource curse ar-
gument. The reason for these different results is precisely
due to the scope of the timeframe, data and distinguish-
ingmeasurement instruments used. Additionally, Luong and
Weinthal (2010) argue that taking the late 1970s as a start
date implies that resource-rich countries’ political and eco-
nomic history only starts with the production of oil, which
undermines “path-dependent effects” and restricts the re-
search’s ability to provide nuanced historical, geographical
and cultural perspectives.
From a qualitative perspective, one may question what
are the non-resource methods that may ﬁnance violence?
Wennmann (2007) argues that while natural resources
have contribution to some conﬂicts they are nevertheless
not the only sources of ﬁnance for a rebel group. Most rebel
conﬂicts have multiple methods of ﬁnancing, namely kid-
napping, levying money from civilians and companies,
external assistance and asset transfers from supporters. Thus,
emphasis on natural resources does not provide the full
picture of conﬂict ﬁnancing.
Another group of scholars propose the ‘rentier state’
counter-argument which holds that resource-wealthy
states use these asserts to buy peace through repression,
corruption, and patronage, even though such behaviors may
lead to grievances emerging among the local population
(Basedau & Lay, 2009; Kaldor, Karl, & Said, 2007; Lowi, 2009).
The rentier state hypothesis proposes a number of mecha-
nisms being utilized by resource rich countries to protect
their stability. First, the rentier states use the high income
from oil to create politically stable platforms (Ostrowski,
2013). A second mechanism is repression which resource
revenues being spent on increasing the state security ap-
paratus so as to restrict the growth of possible opposition
movements. Third, resource rich governments can use the
oil revenues to buy off opposition groups and appease their
demands, which can restrict the emergence of rebel leaders
or other political parties besides the ruling one. Finally, rev-
enues can provide the resource rich state with external
protection. Due to the vital importance of energy security,
external powers may offer to protect such governments in
case of rebellion or attack (Basedau & Lay, 2009).
Considering these arguments, one obvious conclusion
from this section is that the existing literature offers a wide
diversity of concepts. The advantage of having this varia-
tion is that it allows a wide range of dimensions on the
relationship between natural resources and conﬂict to be
covered. The disadvantage of these groups is that they
explain the concept of conﬂict from a limited side. In doing
so, they miss one of the other dimensions, namely non-
resource dimensions, different methods of conﬂict ﬁnancing,
lack of common point among statistical ﬁndings and dif-
ference characteristics of resource regions. The common view
is that the availability of natural resources is the key problem
for political, economic and social developments. It may also
be other way around, poor political, economic, and social
institutions and developments might be the main reason
for an effective management of natural resources. In other
words, it could be the weak management of other non-
resource dimensions that lead to conﬂict.
4.2. Interstate conﬂicts and natural resources
How does the literature explain the nexus between non-
renewable resources and inter-state conﬂicts? To answer this
question, scholarly focus has been placed on multiple dif-
ferent world regions such as the Caspian Sea region, the
Middle East, the Arctic Sea region, the South China Sea
and the Mediterranean. In order to enhance the abun-
dance argument, scholars have proposed a variety of other
dimensions including location, resource prices, great power
competition and revolutionary governments (Alabi, 2013;
Borgerson, 2009; Kleveman, 2004; Colgan, 2013; De Soysa
et al., 2009; Klare, 2001a, 2001b).
The ﬁrst group of scholars uses the Great Game to de-
scribe resource rich regions, such as the Caspian Sea region
and the Arctic Sea region (Borgerson, 2009; Kleveman, 2004).
In doing so, the ﬁrst group proposes these regions as the
new locations for the Great Game in a ﬁght over energy re-
sources. In 2009, Scott G. Borgerson argued that the Great
Game had moved to the Arctic Sea region from the Caspian
Sea region due to its geostrategic advantages and rich natural
resources. The reason for the Great Power movement to the
Arctic Sea region is the increasing military naval infrastruc-
tures and development of ports. However, one could argue
10 Seven Sisters was term used to describe seven big oil companies in
the 1950s. The group included Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Gulf Oil, Stan-
dard Oil of California, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell; Standard Oil of New Jersey
and Standard Oil Company of New York.
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that these infrastructure developments might in fact be
because of the Arctic Sea region’s harsh natural environ-
ment rather than great power competition. Surprisingly,
Borgerson changed his pessimistic argument regarding the
Arctic Sea region developments in his 2013 article, “The
coming Arctic Boom”. Borgerson explains that “many ob-
servers – including me-predicted that […] the race for
resources would inevitably end in conﬂict […]. Proving pes-
simists wrong, the Arctic countries have given up on saber
rattling and engaged in various impressive feats of coop-
eration” (2013, p. 2). This example illustrate that the
argument about great power competition for the Caspian
Sea region’s or over the Arctic Sea region’s natural re-
sources is just the product of the exaggeration of certain
scholars due to the false perception that the region can be
an alternative energy source to the Persian Gulf.
Colgan (2010, 2014), De Soysa et al. (2009) propose the
‘aggressive state’ hypothesis as an alternative argument,
which claims that high oil prices encourage petro-states to
behave more aggressively in the international arena.11
There is a systematic debate among these scholars. Colgan
(2010, 2014) combines the idea of high oil revenuewith rev-
olutionary states, and proposes the ‘revolutionary petro-
state’ theory. “Petro-revolutionary states are roughly
three and a half times as likely to instigate a militarized
interstate dispute (MID) than are non-revolutionary, non-
petrostates” (Colgan, 2014, p. 200). Colgan (2014) posits
three main reasons for revolutionary petro-states aggres-
siveness. First, high oil revenue encourages petro-leaders
to take risks. Second, oil revenue is an important ﬁnancial
means for buying domestic political support and legitimiz-
ing internal power. Third, revolutionary leaders have fewer
internal executive restrictions.
By using the ‘strategic oil’ argument, De Soysa et al. offer
another reason for the aggressive foreign policy of petro-
states, the ‘security guarantee of powerful countries’ (2011,
p. 6). They claim that oil exporting countries are more likely
initiators of conﬂict and more aggressive because of great
power protection. The reason for this is that powerful oil
importers prefer to protect oil exporters, so as to preserve
their continuous access to oil resources and prevent oil prices
from increasing. Considering these arguments, one may
question that if great powers prefer stable oil prices, then
oil rich regions should be less aggressive and more stable.
Otherwise aggressive behavior of resource states will disturb
the production and transportation of oil.
In contrast to the ﬁndings of Colgan and De Soysa, Caselli
et al. (2013, p. 7) argue that by looking at similar “di-
rected dyads”, they in fact arrive at different outcomes
regarding petro-states. According to their ﬁndings, oil-
rich states are less likely to be initiators of conﬂict. The
authors explain that the reason for this opposite outcome
might be because of differences in the chosen case studies
and methods. They contribute to the resource-conﬂict dis-
cussion by developing their own distinguished perspective,
which is termed the ‘geographical dimension’. Caselli,
Morelli, and Rohner (2014) formulate threemain arguments
herein: when oil is near the border and only one country
has oil, the chance of conﬂict is high; when oil is far from
the border, conﬂict tends to be less likely to happen; when
both countries have natural resources and if the resources
are distributed asymmetrically vis-à-vis borders, the prob-
ability of conﬂict onset is strong.
In short, the resource abundancy literature represents
partly the aggregation of many diverse arguments and partly
a systematic discussion between several different schol-
ars. Taken separately, the abundancy arguments have several
empirical shortcomings. Firstly, the existing works over-
look the geographical dimension. In other words, in some
places there was conﬂict even before the discovery of natural
resources as was the case in the Mediterranean Sea, the
Caspian Sea region or the Persian Gulf. In this regard, natural
resources might be a scapegoat for the unrest experi-
enced in unstable geographic areas rather than the actual
cause of that instability. Secondly, the existing literature
undermines the cost of resource conﬂict. For example,
Meierding (2016) identiﬁes no evidence for the oil war hy-
pothesis of De Soya, Colgan, Hendrix and Nolland. By
scrutinizing four case studies, the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s in-
vasion of Kuwait, the ChacoWar and Japan’s invasion of the
Dutch East Indies she concludes that the fundamental
reasons for these wars were security, regime survival and
territory rather than oil. She argues that the abundancy lit-
erature neglects three dimensions of conﬂict, namely
international cost, transportation cost of natural resources
and invasion cost. In the same vein, by using another re-
source related case, Fettweis (2011) claims the Arab Oil
Embargo helped to strengthen the cooperation among con-
sumers rather than the establishing of further divisions
among the powerful consumers. Finally, this research ﬁnds
that number of scholars, who are skeptical about the nexus
between natural resources and conﬂict is growing. These
scholars challenge the ﬁndings of previous works by offer-
ing an alternative empirical and quantitative results (e.g.
Boschini et al., 2007; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009 ;
Fettweis, 2011; Meierding, 2016).
5. Research shortcomings and conclusion
In the following section, I explain persistent research
shortcomings and diﬃculties in the theoretical and empir-
ical arguments that have been put forward so far. The
concept of resource conﬂict is structured and explained dif-
ferently by different scholars at different times. While the
development of related ideas and expressions was partly
affected by the events of the 1970s such as the Arab Oil
Embargo, some of the (skewed) thinking emerged above all
from the false intuition and overestimation of scholars, such
as Great Game.
First, function of natural resources in conﬂict is nar-
rowly explained. Less research has been devoted to non-
resource factors of conﬂicts and their connection with
resources. Conﬂict is composed of multiple dimensions (po-
litical, economic, historical, cultural, ethnic and geographical
etc.) rather than single factor. It is not clear how non-
resource dimensions of conﬂict interact with natural
resources, namely poor performance of state institutions or
scarcity of state capacity One may understand how natural
11 Other scholars who support this claim are Ross and Voeten 2015;
Friedman 2006; Hendrix 2015; Hendrix and Noland 2014.
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resources inﬂuence non-resource dimensions but one may
not ﬁnd how and whether non-resource dimensions affect
scarcity or abundancy of natural resources. In this regard,
it is not suﬃcient to simply propose scarcity or abundancy
of natural resources as the fundamental reason for conﬂicts.
Second, less research has scrutinized political and eco-
nomic costs of resources wars, namely occupation cost,
international cost and investment costs (e.g. Meierding,
2016). The existing works give a misleading impression that
resource incomes can cover easily invasion, investment and
international costs of wars.
Third, the existing works consider approximately most
resource states to be more or less equal entities. Although
such states may have equal rights from juridical perspec-
tive, they share too many diverse features to be considered
equal entities in other empirical terms. For example, while
Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia have rich natural resources, they
are dissimilar in a number of other important ways.
However, both qualitative and quantitative analyses neglect
this factor while explaining the resource-conﬂict nexus.
Therefore, it is unwise to lump different case studies to-
gether in the same category without considering the
particular characteristics of the region or country in question.
Moreover, wide part of the existing works adopts a
national-level approach by portraying abundancy, scarcity
and conﬂict at the unitary state-level. Nevertheless, natural
resources are distributed inconsistently over a nation’s ter-
ritory. In other words, only particular places, namely cities
or urban areas are affected by the abundancy or scarcity of
resources. Hence, conﬂict more likely develops in areas
which are excluded from resource wealth and develop-
ment. However, the present works neglect the distinctive
characteristics between resource rich cities and non-
resource cities by putting them into country level analysis.
Inadequate explanation of actors and players in re-
source governance is another weak point. The majority of
the literature has surveyed the resource-conﬂict relation-
ship through the lens of sovereign states or the great powers.
The rest of the actors (companies, ﬁnancial institutions,
NGOs, and etc.) are superﬁcially recognized because these
actors represent states’ national interests. Therefore, little
research has focused on other players, such as the role of
regional and international organizations (e.g. Hendrix &
Noland, 2014;Price-Smith, 2015; Schrijver, 2010). Despite
their key importance, states are not the sole actors in the
sustainable management and use of natural resources. There
are several actors that are involved actively in resourceman-
agement and disputed areas. Although these actors are not
the panaceas for global issues, resource state cannot simply
ignore their interests. Meanwhile, to protect their own in-
terests, these actors to some extent affect the security and
stability of resource rich regions. Considering, the role of
multiple actors is thus crucial, in order to pursue a multi-
level analysis and view the complex interdependency of
these actors from different perspectives.
Finally, from the perspective of quantitative analysis, there
are a number of competing statistical ﬁndings that make
to ﬁnd common and general outcome. The variation of
results over time is an important diﬃculty. This time factor
can be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst refers to the period
of data analysis, in which studies are conducted; the second
to publication time, meaning the timespan within which
scholars publish their articles. According to the ﬁrst factor,
arguments, statistical outcomes and the ﬁndings of schol-
ars differ from each other, such as with the argument of
conﬂict onset versus duration, or the resource curse. In this
respect, assumption made and results obtained depend on
the broadness of the timeframe and scope of research used
(Luong & Weinthal, 2010). From the perspective of publi-
cation time meanwhile, the quality of argument, data and
contexts are all different. The earliest research studies used
only low quality explanations and arguments vis-a-vis
natural resources.
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